
From Nuclear Threats to Infrastructure Fragility: Reassessing Global Security in the Modern Era
In 2005, the docudrama The Last Best Chance painted a grim picture of the possibilities of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors, emphasizing the risks and prevalence of potential sources for nuclear weapons grade material. (Last Best Chance) At that time, this threat reflected the global anxieties of a post 9/11 world, and the idea that international terrorist organizations could obtain weapons of mass destruction and wreck havoc like never before. Since that time, however, the global security landscape has shifted dramatically. In the current day, the gravest danger is no longer that a rogue faction or terrorist cell may procure nuclear devices. Rather, the gravest threat to modern society is the fragility of the infrastructure that modern society depends on every day – in particular, the electricity, communications, food, water and sanitation systems. These interconnected and interdependent technologies have become the backbone of modern life as well as the Achille’s heel of the first world.
As first world nations have advanced their economies, healthcare systems and communications networks, they have become increasingly dependent upon uninterrupted access to electricity, the internet and automated logistics. Power utilities manage everything from schools and hospitals to traffic lights and subways. Just this week, we have seen a shining example of how devastating a power and communications blackout can be – when Spain and Portugal lost power for just 18 hours (Kirby). Suddenly there was no train service, traffic lights were down, refrigeration stopped working putting food and medicine in immediate peril. Most notably, however, was the impact on communication. Cell service and internet communication was limited at best, and non existent at worst, leaving people quite literally and figuratively in the dark as to what was happening.
This high level of dependency creates a system of immense efficiency, but also extreme fragility. Any number of single failures can cause an upset large enough to derail the entire system. From something as directed as a cyber attack from a foreign nation or non-state actor to a freak accident that shorts a main power node will have widespread effects. Without proper safeguards and training for how to handle situations when the standard operating procedures are not an option, modern societies leave themselves vulnerable to panic and disorder.
In 2010, the malware known as Stuxnet drew considerable attention by the public and researchers to the true vulnerabilities of industrial automation (Dünhaupt). What made Stuxnet and other malware so concerning is that they were designed specifically to target industrial automation systems – those that run facilities that include power plants, gas pipelines, and factories. By showing the world that such programs do exist and can be used effectively, it became all to clear that power grids, water distribution systems and other critical infrastructure are viable targets.
The greatest deterrent to this fragility is not rebuilding or retrofitting existing infrastructure because it would take immense time and resources. Furthermore, at the speed that technology is advancing, especially with AI at the forefront, there will never be a way to completely deter an adversary from attacking with some new as-yet-unknown cyber tool. What we need then is not a deterrent against attack or system failures, but a deterrent against the panic and disorder that would ensue from such an event by developing a mindset of resilience and preparedness into the culture. After the Trump administration recently pulled military aid and backing from NATO, the threat of potential cyber attacks and military invasion into the EU by Russia became a real risk. Countries all across the EU worked quickly to inform their citizens about the realities of living without common amenities and what to do about it. Sweden, for example, created and sent a document to every citizen titled “In Case of Crisis Or War” that outlines basic precautionary measures for how to weather a catastrophic failure of the main infrastructure systems, and quell panic and disorder.
Arguably, The Last Best Chance showcased a way to stop potential nuclear attacks through the control of nuclear proliferation. However it also illustrated a greater issue: getting baseline energy, water and health systems up and running after a disaster – nuclear or otherwise – poses a great challenge as well. Given this knowledge, the focus could be shifted from just trying to stop nuclear attacks to attempting to deter any and all manner of mass casualty or infrastructure-devastating event. Unfortunately, without unlimited resources and manpower, such an omniscient ability to prevent all attacks and disasters is impossible. There will always be some new disaster, some new threat, some new boogie man. In the face of this, the traditional meaning of ‘deterrence’ does not apply. The heavy dependence on internet, electricity and critical infrastructure for nearly every facet of life has created an extremely fragile ecosystem that will be disrupted by any number of disasters or attacks.
Ultimately, the most powerful ‘deterrence’ that modern societies can develop is adaptability and self reliance. Building a culture of preparedness and self-reliance where citizens are trained, educated and mentally equipped to handle major disruptions is the key to overcoming any challenge of the modern day. With infrastructure dependence being the greatest danger of today, resilience is the strongest form of defense and way to tomorrow.
Citations:
Last Best Chance. Directed by Ben Goddard, performances by Fred Thompson and Jon Gries, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2005.
Kirby, Paul. “How Spain Powered Back to Life from Unprecedented National Blackout.” BBC News, 30 Apr. 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c175ykvjxyeo.
Dünhaupt, Stephanie. Vulnerabilities of Industrial Automation Systems. Seminarausarbeitung, Embedded Security Group – Prof. Dr.-Ing. Christof Paar, 27 Mar. 2012.
Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB). In Case of Crisis or War. 2024, https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/30874.pdf.

